A Piece that I have written for my boss last week. It is long, but informative.
Much news has been made about the IAEA report released last week indicating, for the first time publically that Iran may be working on a nuclear warhead for the Shahab missile and has been since 2004. However, just a few months ago, portions of an internal IAEA report entitled, “Possible Military Dimensions of Iran’s Nuclear Program” were leaked to the AP and our friends at ISIS, who did a great review. It seems that the language of the leaked internal report has made its way into the publically released IAEA report. While the information is not new, the fact that the information is now public is noteworthy, especially given language of the new report.
While the language of the latest IAEA report is not as forceful concerning the accusations toward Iran weaponization as the leaked internal report, there are still bits and pieces that have made the transition.
Already one section of the internal report found its way into a previous IAEA report:
The leaked report, page 3:
The information, which has been obtained from multiple sources, is detailed in content and appears to be generally consistent. The information refers to known Iranian persons and institutions under both the military and civil apparatuses, as well as to some degree to their confirmed procurement activities.
The August 2009, GOV 2009/55, pages 4 and5:
Notwithstanding, as the Director General has repeatedly emphasized, the information contained in that documentation appears to have been derived from multiple sources over different periods of time, appears to be generally consistent, and is sufficiently comprehensive and detailed that it needs to be addressed by Iran with a view to removing the doubts which naturally arise, in light of all of the outstanding issues, about the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.
The latest report, pages 8 and 9:
The information available to the Agency in connection with these outstanding issues is extensive and has been collected from a variety of sources over time. It is also broadly consistent and credible in terms of the technical detail, the time frame in which the activities were conducted and the people and organizations involved.
These passages are key in that previous reports have only focused on one or a limited set of documents, but now the IAEA has a more solid foundation of evidence for their accusations about the nature of the Iranian program.
Another item that has made its way over is the reference to “activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile” in the latest IAEA report.
The leaked report, page2:
The Agency has information, known as the Alleged Studies, that the Ministry of Defence of Iran has conducted and may still be conducting a comprehensive programme aimed at the development of a nuclear payload to be delivered using the Shahab 3 missile system.
The latest report, page 9:
Altogether, this raises concerns about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. These alleged activities consist of a number of projects and sub-projects, covering nuclear and missile related aspects, run by military related organizations.
Following that the IAEA report on page 9 stated:
42. Among the activities which the Agency has attempted to discuss with Iran are: activities involving high precision detonators fired simultaneously; studies on the initiation of high explosives and missile re-entry body engineering; a project for the conversion of UO2 to UF4, known as “the green salt project”; and various procurement related activities. Specifically, the Agency has, inter alia, sought clarification of the following: whether Iran was engaged in undeclared activities for the production of UF4 (green salt) involving the Kimia Maadan company; whether Iran’s exploding bridgewire detonator activities were solely for civil or conventional military purposes; whether Iran developed a spherical implosion system, possibly with the assistance of a foreign expert knowledgeable in explosives technology; whether the engineering design and computer modeling studies aimed at producing a new design for the payload chamber of a missile were for a nuclear payload; and the relationship between various attempts by senior Iranian officials with links to military organizations in Iran to obtain nuclear related technology and equipment.
In the leaked report, this is referenced in several sections. In reference to the “Green Salt Project” and Alleged Studies the leaked report states, page 3:
The Alleged Studies conducted by Iran refer, inter alia, to the development work performed to redesign the inner cone of the Shahab 3 missile re-entry vehicle to accommodate a nuclear warhead. The Studies further describe the development and testing of high voltage detonator firing equipment and multiple exploding bridge wire (EBW) detonators as well as an underground testing infrastructure and the probable testing of one full-scale hemispherical explosively driven shock system that could be applicable to an implosion-type nuclear device. Another aspect concerns the conversion of (UO2) to uranium tetrafluoride (UF4), also known as Green Salt.
In terms of High Explosives on pages 3, 4:
Information received from a Member State indicates a round, semi-round and semi-spherical shock generator system for which an EBW detonator is being developed. It is said that the shock generator was fired in field test conditions with one detonator using a firing cable.
[snip]
It is believed that Iran has developed exploding bridgewire detonators and associated electronic high voltage firing systems. The Agency assesses that Iran has managed to develop a high explosives industry capable of synthesizing and formulating the raw materials into explosive compositions and that could be used in a nuclear weapon.
The new report stops short of claims in the leaked internal report that Iran has sufficient information to build a crude nuclear device using HEU. Nor does the most recent IAEA report specifically mention the Shahab 3 Missile, although one could assume that the IAEA is referring to the Shahab 3.
But, what is interesting is what is in the most recent IAEA report, but not in the leaked report. While previous reports have mentioned an issue with Polonium 210 which could be used for neutron generation of neutrons, considered resolved in February 2008, the latest report again mentions neutron generation as a possible concern. Page 9:
The Agency would also like to discuss with Iran: the project and management structure of alleged activities related to nuclear explosives; nuclear related safety arrangements for a number of the alleged projects; details relating to the manufacture of components for high explosives initiation systems; and experiments concerning the generation and detection of neutrons. Addressing these issues is important for clarifying the Agency’s concerns about these activities and those described above, which seem to have continued beyond 2004.
In addition, the report also mentions, for the first time publically, that these allegations have continued since 2004, which of course runs in contrast to the belief that the Iranians stopped their weapons program in 2003.
It appears that the IAEA has taken a tougher line on Iran, now slowly using harsher, more specific language that previous reports. It also appears that in terms of the divides in the IAEA, the Safeguards division is winning out over EXPO. DG Yukiya Amano does seem to be ratcheting up the pressure on Iran. It will be very interesting to see if the trend continues of leaks in subsequent reports.
Latest IAEA Report:
http://www.armscontrolwonk.com/file_download/222/gov2010_10.pdf
ISIS Report on the leaked IAEA memo:
http://isis-online.org/uploads/isis-reports/documents/IAEA_info_3October2009.pdf
August 2009 IAEA report:
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2009/gov2009-55.pdf
Feb. 2008 IAEA Report:
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2008/gov2008-4.pdf