queencitybuckeye;1431996 wrote:No, it's a distinction without a difference. As usual, your alligator mouth is writing checks that your hummingbird intellect can't cash. You're wrong and instead of just admitting it, you parse words.
Why did Scalia write the exact words that I wrote "traditionally lawful purposes such as defense within the home" and not use the language that you used? Scalia, a textualist, is capable of choosing his words carefully and for specific reason is he not?
In the introduction he goes on to say this:
Like most rights, the Second Amendment right is not unlimited. It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose: For example, concealed weapons prohibitions have been upheld under the Amendment or state analogue
It is expounded upon within the text of the opinion.
Like most rights, the right secured by the
Second Amendment is not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. See,
e.g.,
Sheldon, in 5 Blume 346; Rawle 123; Pomeroy 152–153; Abbott333.
For example, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons were lawful under the
Second Amendment or state analogues. See,
e.g.,
State v.
Chandler, 5 La. Ann., at 489–490;
Nunn v.
State, 1 Ga., at 251; see generally 2 Kent *340, n. 2; The American Students’ Blackstone 84, n. 11 (G. Chase ed. 1884). Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical analysis today of the full scope of the
Second Amendment , nothing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of arms
In the footnote he writes this:
We identify these presumptively lawful regulatory measures only as examples; our list does not purport to be exhaustive
So, if an individual had a right to carry a firearm for
any lawful purpose and not just traditionally lawful purposes under Heller, it would a violation of the 2nd Amendment for a state to bar a man from carrying a gun in his pocket while he walks down the street minding his own affairs...but the court explicitly does not go this far noting that a majority of 19th century courts have traditionally held such prohibitions to be valid. In fact, the Court specifically denied a Writ for a case concerning concealed weapons about a week ago.
I appreciate the insults but I think you're probably just miffed that you thought it was "any lawful purpose" when it clearly is not and it does make a difference. FWIW I've never heard of a hummingbird intellect before...perhaps a reflection on my hummingbird intellect, eh???:thumbup: